Can One Man Make a Difference?: An Analysis of the Effects of the Crimes of Gilbert Bland on Rare Book and Special Collection Security Measures and a Review of the Evolution of Recommended Security Guidelines by Foley, Alison M.
 Alison M. Foley. Can One Man Make a Difference?: An Analysis of the Effects of the 
Crimes of Gilbert Bland on Rare Book and Special Collection Security Measures and a 
Review of the Evolution of Recommended Security Guidelines. A Master’s Paper for the 
M.S. in L.S. degree. April, 2005. 36 pages. Advisor: Helen R. Tibbo 
In large part because of his methods—cutting maps out of rare books during open hours 
and under observation—infamous thief Gilbert Bland caused shockwaves in the academic 
library community in the 1990s and highlighted attention on the lack of comprehensive 
security measures in place in rare books and special collections repositories. Archivists 
and curators from the institutions targeted by Bland were interviewed to determine how 
much the Bland incidents affected the security measures in place.  Interviews were also 
conducted with curators at institutions not targeted by Bland to determine if Bland’s 
crimes had an effect on the wider professional community. Additionally, a review of the 
professional literature was undertaken to evaluate the evolution of recommended security 
guidelines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As long as there have been libraries, there have been security problems.  As the 
methods of theft have changed, so have the responses and attempts at prevention.  From 
placing curses in precious Egyptian volumes, to chaining down books in medieval 
monasteries, to electronic surveillance of reading rooms, the keepers of historical 
documents have struggled to protect their collections.  
Even during the Middle Ages, when access to literary works was very limited—in 
large part available only to clergy—theft was an issue.  The Renaissance saw an 
explosion of book collecting.  In many cases collections were created through theft, as 
books became coveted as objects rather than for their content.1  More recently, the 1980s 
saw an increase in book thefts accompanying a dramatic increase in the market value of 
rare books.2
The reasons for theft are varied, but have not changed significantly through time.  
Books are stolen out of greed, out of hatred for libraries and librarians, and even by a 
misguided few to “protect” the items from the poor handling of librarians and other 
patrons.  All libraries and public collections are at risk for theft and mutilation of books, 
journals, and other materials.  Special collections, rare books and archives are particularly 
vulnerable, as many of the items they hold are unique and of high monetary and historical 
value, and therefore irreplaceable. 
                                                 
1 K. Lesley Knieriem, Book-Fools of the Renaissance, (University of Illinois Graduate School of Library 
and Information Science Occasional Papers, 1993), 5. 
2 William E. Chadwick, “Special Collection Library Security: An Internal Audit Perspective.” Journal of 
Library Administration, 25 (1998) : 16. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Crime and Criminals 
Many early writings on book theft focus not on how to secure collections, but 
rather, on the stories of the thieves themselves.  This was in part because their crimes 
were seen as so audacious.  The boldness of many of these early book thieves led to the 
idea of the book thief as “bibliomaniac,” and gave us literature in which the varied 
motivations and crimes of bibliomaniacs were explored.  Works such as Bibliomania in 
the Middle Ages by F. Somner Merryweather in 1933, The Anatomy of Bibliomania by 
Holbrook Jackson in 1950 and Bibliokleptomania by Lawrence S. Thompson in 1968 laid 
out the stories of alleged “book madness” and the crimes to which it led, and attempted to 
understand the psychological problems and sociological implications of this affliction.3  
 
There are many tales of bibliomaniacs throughout the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance.  In her thesis on the subject, K. Lesley Knieriem categorizes the different 
types of bibliomaniacs by what she believes to be their differing motivations, including 
those financial, aesthetic, nostalgic, nationalistic, for social climbing and even altruistic, 
as in the case of Thomas Bodley (1545-1613).4    This last type of motivation is by far the 
least common in the world of bibliomania.  Even in the case of Bodley (the only case 
identified as altruistic) the altruism was deemed “the self-centered altruism of a late 
Renaissance book-fool.”5
                                                 
3 Lawrence S. Thompson, Bibliokleptomania, (Berkeley, CA: Peacock Press, 1968), 7. 
4 K. Lesley Knieriem, Book-Fools of the Renaissance, (University of Illinois Graduate School of Library 
and Information Science Occasional Papers, 1993), 5. 
5 Ibid., 57. 
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By far the most infamous bibliomane in history was Don Vincente, a former 
Spanish monk alleged to have committed eight murders in his fervent quest for books.6  
Don Vincente did not consider himself a thief, as he testified in court, but believed he 
was serving a higher purpose.  When asked if he was sorry about committing the murders 
he proclaimed, “Every man must die sooner or later, but good books must be 
conserved.”7
As book thieves can be truly fascinating subjects, the examination of 
psychological aspects of book theft has continued to the present in works such as A 
Gentle Madness by Nicholas A. Basbanes (1995) and in journal articles such as Philip 
Weiss’ “The Book Thief: A True Tale of Bibliomania” published in Harper’s Magazine 
in 1994 and “Biblioklepts” by Christopher Reed in a 1997 issue of Harvard Magazine.  
These examinations generally focus on individual book thieves and their motivations.  In 
particular, there have been numerous examinations of the case of Stephen Carrie 
Blumberg, the title thief of Weiss’ Tale. 
Indeed, Stephen Blumberg has been written about more than any other modern-
day book thief.  Blumberg spent over twenty years looting libraries throughout the United 
States and Canada.  It is estimated that in this time he took some 23,600 books from at 
least 268 libraries.8  Blumberg was very good at what he did and managed to sneak into 
even the most ‘secure’ rare book collections to get what he wanted.9  He was also very 
good at covering his tracks, removing almost all traces of identification from the works 
he stole. 
                                                 
6 Nicholas A. Basbanes, A Gentle Madness, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995), 33. 
7 Ibid., 34. 
8 Ibid., 467. 
9 Weiss, Phillip. “The Book Thief: A True Tale of Bibliomania,” Harper’s Magazine 288 (January 1994) : 
37. 
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 The Blumberg case has also served as an example in a lot of literature that is 
focused not just on the tales of exceptional thieves, but on security issues.  Because 
Blumberg was able to bypass security measures in so many ways at so many highly 
reputable libraries, he is mentioned in many articles as a cautionary tale. 
Security Guidelines 
Even before Blumberg, security in archives and special collections was a big 
issue.  Professionals and professional organizations began to prepare guidelines that 
would assist individual repositories and the profession as a whole to protect their 
holdings.   
A review of the literature on special collection security may lead one to assume 
that the more things change, the more they stay the same.  Security guidelines themselves 
have only primarily changed in the use of new technologies, however, the perception of 
security issues and the willingness to discuss them within the profession has changed 
much more.  Security and crime are issues that archivists and curators—the 
“gatekeepers” of our cultural heritage in special collections—have historically not wanted 
to think too much about or discuss.  In large part this reticence was due to a fear of 
admitting that their collections were vulnerable.  Fear also affected how thefts, once 
discovered, were handled, as it was thought that donors might rethink their donations to a 
collection they deemed unsafe.  Yet the issues of security and crime are of the utmost 
importance: without proper security, donors will be unwilling to share their collected 
works, and great public collections will not be available. 
The focus on security issues in large part emerged through the efforts of the 
Society of American Archivists (SAA) and their Archival Security Program Committee, 
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which was formed in the 1970s with some urging by James B. Rhoads.  Rhoads’ 1966 
American Archivist article “Alienation and Theory: Archival Problems,” addressed the 
issues of security and put forward suggestions on the handling of thefts, starting with an 
identification of the major causes.  Rhoads asserted that there were two major reasons 
that people steal documents.  The first was simple greed, and included people who stole 
for monetary gain.  The second was impulse, which encompassed a large and diverse 
group of thieves including kleptomaniacs and the mentally deranged.10
 In the article, Rhoads focused in part on how dealers, collectors and repositories 
should work together to serve all of their interests, as collaboration was the surest way to 
discourage theft and make it more difficult.  He also explained that there were four basic 
requirements he felt were essential measures for repositories to protect archival holdings, 
though he did acknowledge that, “no system of deterrents is universally suitable.”11
The first measure that Rhoads felt was essential was “round-the clock” 
surveillance.  This included employing guards, mechanical or electronic alarm systems, 
or some combination of the two.  The second suggestion was the development of 
procedures that would insure that thieves were not given access to manuscripts to begin 
with.  The third, and most basic measure, was barring researchers from the stacks and 
storage areas and the creation and use of separate, staffed, reading rooms.  Lastly, he 
suggested a systematic marking program to ensure institutional ownership could be 
identified.12
                                                 
10 Rhoads, James B. “Alienation and Theory: Archival Problems,” American Archivist 29 (April 1966) : 
197-208. 
11 Ibid., 202. 
12 Ibid., 203. 
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 Rhoads understood that not all repositories could implement all of these 
‘essential’ measures.  Specifically, he noted that not all items could be marked and that 
repositories needed to be selective in their marking and consider the use of security 
copies.  The step that Rhoads felt was most important, and that could be implemented at 
all repositories, was the training of staff to be a little less trusting and more watchful.  As 
he asserted, “A good archivist must [be] suspicious!”13  
Rhoads also suggested procedures for the aftermath of a theft, including the 
vigorous prosecution of thieves.  He further suggested that the SAA act as a 
clearinghouse for theft information so that the collaboration he promoted could be more 
easily undertaken.14
In part due to Rhoads’ prompting while he was President of SAA, the archival 
security program committee was created by a small group of members.  Once formed, 
this committee was able to secure a grant from the NEH of slightly over $99,000 to 
support their security initiative, including a national register of lost or stolen archival 
materials.15
The SAA security committee was not alone in trying to tackle the issues of 
repository security.  In September of 1973, the Burns Security Institute of New York 
published the results of their “National Survey on Library Security.”  Asserting that 
library crime was about much more than just financial loss, the firm undertook a survey 
of 255 public libraries and covered many aspects of dangers, protection and prevention.16  
While the main focus of the Burns survey was public libraries, some information on 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 207. 
14 Ibid., 208. 
15 Leab Martin, Abigail. “The Saying and the Doing: The Literature and Reality of Theft Prevention 
Measures in U.S. Archives-Part I,” Library & Archival Security 15 (June 2000) : 27-75. 
16 Burns Security Institute. National Survey on Library Security. New York: Briarcliff Manor, 1973. 
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special collections was included, such as the fact that of 172 reporting libraries, seventy-
eight granted researchers access to their closed stacks.17  Additionally, though roughly 
44% of respondents believed book theft was worse than it had been five years prior, forty 
seven percent had neither security guards nor alarms.18  The Burns group went on to 
suggest that the logical first step to improve security was periodic inventories.  They also 
recommended stricter control over closed stacks and increased cooperation with local fire 
and police departments, suggestions that would be proposed by many writers on archival 
security.19   
One such writer was Edmund Berkeley, Jr., who became “intensely aware of the 
major national problem with archival theft”20 while working at a repository that was 
robbed.  In the aftermath of the theft, Berkeley noted the problems the repository faced, 
starting with the repository’s lack of a shelf list, which seriously hindered their ability to 
identify and locate materials.21  The incident, which was an “insider job,” led to many 
changes at the repository including much more limited access to the vault, the creation of 
a log of vault entries, and the rearrangement of the reading room for better monitoring.  
Berkeley also suggested special training for employees who staffed the reading room 
desk, having the university’s legal advisor review new security, and being more honest 
about theft as the lack of theft reporting only assisted the work of thieves.22  Many of 
Berkeley’s suggestions became the basis for the professional guidelines to follow. 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 8. 
18 Ibid., 18. 
19 Ibid., 14. 
20 Edmund Berkeley, Jr. 1976. “Archival Security: A Personal and Circumstantial View.” Georgia Archive, 
Spring, 3. 
21 Berkeley, Archival Security: A Personal and Circumstantial View, 5. 
22 Ibid, 17. 
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One of the first and most important sets of repository security guidelines was the 
1977 manual written by Timothy Walch for the Society of American Archivists, titled 
simply, “Archives & Manuscripts: Security.”  In the manual, Walch proposed that 
security was “an important but often neglected aspect of archival work.”23  Walch 
proposed procedures to help prevent what he saw as an increasing problem with theft, 
starting with solid security planning with consideration of staff, patrons and the 
collections.  In just six brief chapters, Walch examined nearly all aspects of repository 
security from the creation of security programs to theft deterrence to protections against 
fires and floods.  As pointed out by Abigail Leab Martin in her 2000 report in Library 
and Archival Security, “[Walch] advanced new ideas that would so permeate the 
literature as to become clichés.”24  Indeed, many ideas that have become standard in any 
discussion of archive and special collection security were first set forth by Walch.  
Further, by emphasizing measures that could be implemented at relatively little expense, 
Walch made security for repositories of all sizes a feasible idea. 
Throughout the 1980s, further steps were taken to increase standardization and 
cooperation in security.  An ad hoc security committee was created by the Rare Books 
and Manuscript section (RBMS) of the Association of College and Research Libraries 
(ACRL) in 1979.  In cooperation with the Antiquarian Booksellers Association of 
America (ABAA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the SAA, a central 
listing of missing and stolen works was created.  The database, Bookline Alerts: Missing 
Books and Manuscripts, known as BAMBAM, was a big step.  Previously, many thefts 
were left unreported out of fear of embarrassment or in concern for loss of faith of 
                                                 
23 Timothy Walch, Archives & Manuscripts: Security, (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 1977), 2. 
24 Abigail Leab Martin. 2000. “The Saying and the Doing: The Literature and Reality of Theft Prevention 
Measures in U.S. Archives – Part I.” Library and Archival Security, 15 (2). 
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donors.  With the creation of a central list, repositories and book and manuscript dealers 
could cooperate to help prevent thefts and to track down stolen items when thefts did 
occur.25
In 1982, the ABAA published “Rare Books and Manuscript Thefts: A Security 
System for Librarians, Booksellers, and Collectors” (“Rare Books”) by John H. Jenkins, 
the president of the ABAA.  As stated by Terry Belanger in the forward, the security 
system described in the book was the result of cooperation between librarians, archivists, 
antiquarian booksellers, and book collectors.  But, “the driving force behind this 
cooperation, and indeed, behind the whole current war on book theft, is John Jenkins.”26
Jenkins’ system, “a new and more powerful attempt than has ever been made 
before to prevent book and manuscript theft,”27 starts with an explanation of the nature of 
book thieves and then focuses on what to do after a theft.  The first suggestion is to 
immediately put on notice anybody who might be able to assist in the recovery of the 
item(s), including those to whom the materials might be offered for sale.  This is neither 
the first nor the last time that notification of a theft has been recommended, but it 
remained as one of the measures least likely to be taken. 
Rare Books continues with advice on what to do when stolen books are recovered, 
as well as what to do when one is offered stolen books.  Additionally, Jenkins advises 
how to avoid book thefts, though he notes that prevention “is a complex subject that is 
beyond the scope of [his] guidebook.”28  Nonetheless, he recommends guidelines for 
                                                 
25 John H. Jenkins, Rare Books and Manuscript Thefts: A Security System for Librarian, Booksellers, and 
Collectors, (New York: Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, 1982) I. 
26 John H. Jenkins, Rare Books and Manuscript Thefts: A Security System for Librarians, Booksellers, and 
Collectors, (New York: Antiquarian Booksellers Association of America, 1982), 1. 
27 Ibid, 3. 
28 Ibid, 13. 
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prevention that are much like those suggested by RBMS and Walch.  The suggestions 
included naming a Security Officer with authority to carry out the security program; and 
drafting security policies in conjunction with “the administration, staff, legal authorities, 
and other knowledgeable persons.”29   
Finally, Jenkins recommends minimizing access points to the special collections 
building and stacks areas, background checks conducted upon hiring of employees, 
orientation for researchers and the requirement of a photo id for all users.  Jenkins also 
suggests that the administrators of special collections should be knowledgeable of the 
laws for dealing with theft. 
This legal knowledge was discussed in greater length in 1985 with SAA’s 
publication of “Archives & Manuscripts: Law” as part of their Basic Manual Series.  The 
authors, Gary M. Peterson and Trudy Huskamp Peterson, cover numerous aspects of the 
laws that affect repositories, focusing mainly on federal laws and practices.  The authors 
assert that providing records is the focus of the majority of legal issues, and fall into three 
general areas:  “establishment of researcher identity, credentials, and liability; delivery, 
custody, and return; surveillance and enforcement of regulations.”30  Additionally, the 
guide provides information on how to register researchers, how to handle replevin—the 
recovery of property that has been improperly or illegally taken—and ways of making 
successful relationships with lawyers. 
Security concerns remained a major focus the rest of the 1980s.  The ACRL 
RBMS Ad Hoc Security Committee became permanent and went to work creating new 
guidelines.  Still, much of the literature of the time generalized about all repositories, or 
                                                 
29 Jenkins, 15. 
30 Gary M. Peterson and Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Archives & Manuscripts: Law, (Chicago: Society of 
American Archivists, 1985), 74. 
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dealt solely with large academic libraries.  Some works focused on the types of thieves to 
watch for and how they could be identified.  Others focused on security procedures and 
systems.  Few writers focused on both the types of thieves and security procedures and 
how they were related.  Also increasingly rare were works focused on rare books and 
special manuscript collections rather than on large, general libraries.  One exception to 
this was the 1987 work, Special Collections Security: Problems, Trends, and 
Consciousness by Mary Wyly.  This article explored the changing environment in special 
collections, the increased rate of thefts, the varied types of thieves and their methods, and 
organized responses to theft prevention.31   
Much of the literature that followed reiterated the same basic ideas put forward by 
Walch and others.  Thorough planning was presented as key to any security program, as 
were the placement of a repository security officer, thorough staff training, patron 
registration and closed stacks.  In 1994, the ACRL RBMS Security Committee released 
“Guidelines for the Security of Rare Books, Manuscripts, and Other Special Collections.”  
The guidelines were reminiscent of those proposed by Walch, with some added 
information and further recommendations regarding technology.  The appointment of a 
security officer was still recommended as were close supervision of staff, registration of 
patrons, restricted access to valuable items and awareness of laws for dealing with theft.32
Just after the RBMS Guidelines were released, in 1995, Gregor Trinkaus-Randall 
published “Protecting Your Collections: A Manual of Archival Security” through the 
Society of American Archivists.  Trinkaus-Randall identified six categories of collection 
                                                 
31 Mary Wyly. “Special Collections Security: Problems, Trends, and Consciousness.” Library Trends, 36 
(Summer 1987) : 242. 
32 ACRL Rare Books & Manuscripts Section’s Security Committee. “Guidelines for the Security of Rare 
Books, Manuscripts, and Other Special Collections.” College & Research Libraries News, 60 (October 
1999) : 741-748 
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protection: deterrents to theft; the identification of missing items; environmental controls; 
protection from, prevention of, and recovery from disasters; exhibition and loan of 
materials; and the insurance of valuable items.33
Trinkaus-Randall’s suggestions were similar to the guidelines by the RMBS 
committee.  Both considered it crucial that security plans be written down, and both 
recommended consulting other knowledgeable staff members and legal authorities.  As 
Trinkaus-Randall explained, “the plan must be written down and distributed; otherwise, 
the institution is courting disaster.”34
Because of tight budgets, many institutions were unable to implement all of the 
security measures suggested by the professional guidelines.  It was believed that the 
security measures in place were sufficient and budgets would not allow for electronic 
monitoring systems and other high tech-high priced measures.  For many, that belief 
changed drastically with the discovery of the crimes of Gilbert Bland.   
 
BRIEF REVIEW OF GILBERT BLAND’S CRIMES 
The story of the crimes of Gilbert Joseph Bland, Jr.—aka James Perry—should 
serve as a cautionary tale to all who work in rare books and other special collections. 
Theft and mutilation of materials has always been a concern for administrators of special 
collections, but the crimes of Gilbert Bland stand out from the rest.  Bland’s crimes are 
noteworthy not only for the vast amount of materials he was able to steal, but also for the 
manner in which he committed his crimes.  Previous infamous book thieves, such as 
Stephen Blumberg, devised ways to get around security measures, such as removing 
                                                 
33 Gregor Trinkaus-Randall, Protecting Your Collections: A Manual of Archival Security  (Chicago: Society 
of American Archivists, 1995) 2. 
34 Ibid, 2. 
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materials under cover of night.  Bland stole materials (almost exclusively rare maps) out 
in the open, in front of those who were responsible for monitoring him and other 
researchers using the same collections.   Not only did Bland steal the maps he wanted, he 
mutilated the books from which they came by slashing the maps out with a razor.  
In February of 1994 Bland and his wife opened Antique Maps & Collectibles, 
Ltd. in a shopping complex in Florida.35  Bland proceeded to build his collection by 
stealing centuries-old maps from rare books he found at distinguished universities around 
the country.  Bland was not an expert on antique maps, however, and in addition to 
offering materials at odd—often very low—prices, he made some dealers nervous by his 
“ability to find multiple copies of relatively scarce pieces.”36
Bland kept himself very busy.  Living up to his name, he went about his work 
unnoticed, blending in with other academics and library patrons, and slicing valuable 
maps out of rare books wherever he went.  It was not until December of 1995 that the 
world would finally get wind of Bland’s actions. 
It was at the beautiful George Peabody Library at Johns’ Hopkins University that 
Bland was finally caught.  A fellow patron, Jennifer Bryan—curator of manuscripts at the 
Maryland Historical Society—was watching Bland and began to feel he was up to 
something.  Bryan reported her suspicions to library officials, which led to a footrace 
through Baltimore, with three Peabody security officers chasing after Bland, after he 
dashed out.37
                                                 
35 Miles Harvey, The Island of Lost Maps: A True Story of Cartographic Crime, (New York: Random 
House, 2000), 220. 
36 Harvey, Miles. “Mr. Bland’s Evil Plot to Control the World,” Outside (June 1997) : 
http://outside.away.com/magazine/0697/9706bland.html 
37 Ibid, 2. 
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Once he was brought back to the library, Bland admitted to stealing a map out of 
“The General History of the Late War,” a 1763 volume by John Entick with which he had 
been working.  Upon returning the map, apologizing profusely, and offering several 
hundred dollars in compensation, Bland was released by Peabody security and the 
Baltimore police.38  It was only later that security officials discovered a notebook left 
behind by Bland contained a “hit list” of rare maps and the repositories which held 
them.39
The discovery of the notebook is likely why Peabody librarians began to publicize 
the incident.  As Robert Karrow, the Newberry Library’s curator of maps explains, “A lot 
of library thefts have gone unreported in the past.  You’re embarrassed, and maybe you 
say to yourself, ‘What will the donors think?’  And you’re reluctant to talk about the 
whole issue because you don’t want to give the crazies ideas.”40  Fortunately, librarians 
at the Peabody did not think this way.  After discovering numerous other thefts by Bland 
from previous visits to their own library, Peabody employees began to notify the other 
repositories whose names they had found listed in Bland’s notebook.  They also posted 
the information on ExLibris, an internet discussion group for professionals involved with 
rare books and special collections.  It was because of this that many curators went 
through their records to find that “James Perry” had visited their institutions and that they 
were indeed missing precious items such as a map of “La Florida” from the 1527 
Theatrum Orbis Terrarium, the first modern atlas.41
                                                 
38 Shen, Fern. “They Didn’t Throw the Book at Him; Suspect in Thefts from Rare Volumes is Let Go in 
Baltimore.” The Washington Post, Final Edition, 16 December 1995, Section B (Metro), B1. 
39 Harvey, “Mr. Bland’s Evil Plot,” 2. 
40 Ibid, 13. 
41 Harvey, “Mr. Bland’s Evil Plot,” 1. 
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Though Bland targeted nineteen institutions within the United States, only four 
pressed charges.  Bland was believed to have stolen some two hundred and fifty maps 
from these institutions, worth an estimated half a million dollars or more, yet he served 
less than two years in jail and paid less than eighty thousand dollars in damages.  Further, 
it was discovered after his court cases in the United States that Bland had also spent time 
at repositories in Canada.  In one three day visit to the University of Washington in 
Seattle and Vancouver’s University of British Columbia, Bland stole materials worth fifty 
thousand dollars; damage to the books themselves caused an additional one hundred 
thousand dollars in damages.  Bland never faced charges from these incidents.42
Many people believe that Gilbert Bland did not get nearly as severe a sentence as 
he should have.  As Russell Maylone of Northwestern University told Miles Harvey, “If 
Bland gets in front of my car, I’ll run over him—but in a nice way…Oh, and then I’ll 
back over him again.”43  One of Bland’s plea bargains was even rejected by Superior 
Court Judge Robert Hobgood who felt “the penalty is not severe enough for what this 
man’s done.”44  Professionals involved with rare books and special collections likewise 
fumed over Bland’s light sentence, but were mainly alone.  As Barry Ruderman, a lawyer 
and map dealer, points out,  
“It’s very easy for a prosecutor to say, “He ripped a few pages out of a few 
books?  I’ve got better things to do.  To the ninety-nine percent of people who 
don’t understand the magnitude of what he’s done, Bland just doesn’t seem to 
represent a threat to society.”45   
 
                                                 
42 Beatty, Jim. “Mr. Bland’s Misadventure,” Saturday Night 113, November 1998, in FACTIVA [database 
online] , accessed 19 September 2004. 
43 Harvey, Island of Lost Maps, 133. 
44 Harvey, Island of Lost Maps, 314. 
45 Harvey, “Mr. Bland’s Evil Plot,” 11. 
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Bland’s crimes nonetheless hit rare book and manuscript repositories like a 
shockwave.  Numerous articles about the thefts appeared, and workshops devoted to 
Bland’s crimes and the issues of security were held around the country.46  What Bland 
had succeeded in doing, ironically, was to educate legal authorities about the high 
financial value and historical importance of many library materials.  Further he provided 
a wake up call to repository officials about the need for better security.  As librarian John 
E. Ingram of the University of Florida explained: 
“…the ultimate effect of [Bland’s] ‘work’ is that we have better security for our 
stacks, we have better security for our reading room, we have surveillance, which 
we didn’t really have before—and in the final analysis, we have a much more 
astute, perceptive staff working with the collection, which is probably the best of 
all.”47
 
Once details about the Peabody incident were sent out over ExLibris, curators 
around the country were searching their call slip records and discovering items missing 
from books that Bland, under numerous aliases, had used.  For many, this incident 
highlighted the importance of cooperating with others.  Details of Bland’s activities were 
published on professional listservs (electronic mailing lists) and in numerous newspaper 
articles about the crimes.  This led curators and archivists around the country to review 
their records, which in turn allowed them to identify items missing from their collections 
and add to the shared knowledge of Bland’s activities, allowing the process of claiming 
lost materials to begin. 
Not all of the stolen items have been returned.  Though the FBI took possession of 
many of the stolen maps as part of a plea agreement Bland made, dozens of items remain 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 332. 
47 Ibid., 335. 
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in the care of the FBI because they remain unclaimed.48   While the reactions to the 
Bland case created a much more open atmosphere, and showed that publicizing incidents 
could result in the recovery of stolen items, many curators and librarians are still afraid to 
make thefts known, and some even deny to themselves that they may be, or have been, 
victims of theft.  Even with incontrovertible evidence, some librarians refused to 
acknowledge that items from their collections had been stolen, according to FBI Special 
Agent Gray Hill, who worked on the Bland case for years.49  Seconds Eileen E. Brady, 
former editor of Focus on Security: The Magazine of Library, Archive, and Museum 
Security, “Librarians have an ostrich mentality when it comes to security: they have their 
heads in the sand and their tales in the air, and they’re ripe to be screwed.”50
 
METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this research project is to analyze the evolving professional guidelines 
on special collection security measures, and to investigate the effects of the crimes of 
Gilbert Bland on the security measures in academic library special collections.  Bland’s 
actions, especially his methods, caused shockwaves in the profession in the mid-nineties.  
This in turn focused attention onto the lack of adequate security measures many 
repositories had in place.  To determine what, if any affect Bland’s crimes had on the 
profession, interviews were conducted with librarians and curators from some of the 
institutions targeted by Bland.  In an attempt to determine if the crimes had an even 
broader effect within the profession, interviews were also conducted with librarians and 
                                                 
48 Humphreys, Adrian. “The Extraordinary Mr. Bland,” National Post, 10 October 2000, in FACTIVA, 
accessed 19 September 2004. 
49 Harvey, Island of Lost Maps, 286. 
50 Ibid., 332. 
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curators from other institutions not targeted by Bland, but similar in size and location to 
the target institutions. 
The eight interviewees from target institutions were chosen based on the literature 
and news accounts of the crimes in question.  This included the nineteen institutions 
located in the United States, but not those located in Canada.  The fifteen interviewees 
from non-target institutions were chosen randomly from other institutions around the 
country of similar size and location to the targeted institutions. 
The analysis of professional guidelines is based on a review of the professional 
literature, including journal articles, conference presentations and published books, on 
crime and security measures in special collections. 
 
FINDINGS 
Professional Guidelines 
As illustrated in the above review of professional literature, the guidelines for 
security measures in special collections have not changed significantly since the late 
1960s.  While style and some particulars have changed, the current recommendations for 
special collection security are echoes of the suggestions first put forward by Rhoads and 
Walch decades ago.  The current guidelines were completed by the ACRL Rare Books & 
Manuscripts Section’s Security Committee in October 1999.   
The first recommendation in the ACRL RBMS guidelines is the appointing of a 
Library Security Officer (LSO) by the library director.  The LSO is to be given the 
authority to plan and carry out the security program, should be widely known by other 
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administrators, and should develop cooperative relationships with legal staff, 
administrators and even outside consultants such as local law enforcement agencies. 
The committee’s second recommendation is the creation of a formal, written 
collection security policy, which should be a part of the repository’s standard policies and 
procedures.  The first step in this policy is ensuring that access to collection materials be 
limited.  They propose having as few access points to the collection as possible, and 
keeping the public within public areas, with no access to collection areas.  Another part 
of the access issue is keys and keycards.  It is recommended that keys to secure areas be 
issued only on an “as needed” basis and that locks be changed on a regular basis. 
It is also recommended that staff, including student workers, be chosen very 
carefully.  When feasible, it is suggested that background checks and bonding of 
employees be considered.  Alongside this, it is strongly recommended that all staff be 
thoroughly trained in security guidelines and procedures so that they understand their 
legal rights and their responsibilities.  One major responsibility is balancing the access of 
researchers with the protection of materials.  For this reason it is recommended that all 
researchers be required to register with their name, address, affiliation, and some form of 
identification, preferably a photo identification.  Registration procedures should include 
an orientation of the rules of the repository as well as how to handle materials. 
Another important part of the guidelines as pertaining to researchers is the 
restriction of extraneous items allowed into the reading room.  There should be an area 
available for researchers to stow their personal items, such as coats, notebooks and 
briefcases, rather than allowing them into the reading room.  Additionally, researchers are 
to be monitored at all times and should not be situated in a way that obstructs the view of 
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the monitor.  In addition to monitoring researchers, collection materials should be 
carefully inspected before and after use. 
Lastly, the Committee has recommendations to ensure identification of materials 
should there be a theft or disaster.  Accession and catalog records should be complete and 
up to date.  Information required for insurance policies should also be complete and kept 
current.  Where possible, it is also suggested that materials be marked with a unique 
marking that will allow for identification and recovery of items that may be lost or stolen.  
Though the professional guidelines from Rhoads through RBMS have been fairly 
consistent, their implementation has not. 
Application of Guidelines 
 Through interviews with curators and archivists around the country, it became 
clear that strict adherence to professional guidelines is not the norm, even though many 
of the security improvements recommended by the guidelines can be implemented at low 
cost.  It appears that another factor remains in the way for many, and that is time.  For 
instance, the undertaking of shelf readings requires an extraordinary time commitment, 
especially for those institutions with large collections.  This is another example that 
proves the old saying, time is money. 
Of the 23 subjects interviewed for this project, including those who were Bland’s 
targets, 5 or 22%, have a formal, written security policy.  In some cases, there is a written 
policy for the libraries at their institution, but nothing specific to the special collections 
and rare book departments, even though those areas are at higher risk and usually contain 
items of much greater value.  While the creation of a written policy can indeed be time 
consuming, it is a vitally important part of collection protection.  Even just having the 
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names and numbers of important contacts and legal authorities available to employees 
and a procedure in place for theft response could save valuable time in tracking a thief 
and starting the process of replevin.  All interviewees did say they had written rules of 
use for researchers to read upon registering to use the repository, even if they did not 
have a formal, written policy. 
Repositories fail to follow the security guidelines on many other points.  Only five 
respondent repositories undertake shelf readings and regular inventories while, 78% do 
not.  This is due in large part to the immense size of the collections in large academic 
libraries, especially manuscript collections for which item by item inventories are just not 
possible.  Two of the five repositories that answered affirmatively to undertaking shelf 
readings explained that shelf readings are a ongoing process and take place as time 
allows, frequently done by student assistants.  Almost unanimously, respondents 
explained that their repositories did not have an “official” Library Security Officer as 
recommended by the guidelines.  One respondent repository affirmed that it has an 
“official” library security officer, while six other respondents reported that they act 
informally in this role themselves. 
When asked about their relationship with local authorities, three respondents 
(38%) from the group targeted by Bland reported that they do not feel a need to develop 
the relationship because there are already contacts by their parent libraries with legal 
authorities.  The majority of interviewees who responded positively about a relationship 
with local authorities indicated that the authorities in question are campus police, rather 
than local police or sheriffs.  As one interviewee explained, for many large universities 
the campus police are the first and main contact for legal issues, with other authorities 
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contacted as necessary.  Fortunately, those respondents who have developed relationships 
with their campus police feel that the value and importance of the collections are well 
known to the campus police. 
All respondents confirmed that researchers in their repositories are required to 
register and that call slips are kept permanently.  Almost all of the respondent repositories 
require photo identification, which is either photocopied or held by a staff member while 
the researcher is in the reading room.  Only 4 (17%) respondents affirmed that they do 
not require photo identification.  Likewise all respondents confirmed that researchers are 
limited in what they may take with them into the reading room, although there is some 
variation as to what is allowed.  Specifically, seven of the repositories (30%) allow 
researchers to bring laptops into reading rooms while the others do not.  In a few rare 
cases (two), respondents said they occasionally make exceptions to what is allowed in 
order to avoid difficulty with a patron.  
The monitoring of reading rooms was the question that saw the most variety in 
answers.  Some repositories rely solely on employees to monitor the reading rooms.  
Others have video cameras in the reading rooms, and a few also have motion detectors 
for hours the repository is closed in both the reading rooms and stacks areas.  Budgetary 
concerns trumped fear of theft in nearly all cases where cameras were not utilized.  Asked 
about security training, none of the respondents had attended any kind of training classes, 
nor did their employees.  Additionally, most interviewees did not perform thorough 
background checks on employees or have them bonded, though access by employees was 
restricted in some repositories. 
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While most of the respondents indicated that they did not strictly follow 
professional security guidelines, they were all aware of the guidelines, such as those by 
ACRL.  Additionally, most respondents explained that even though they did not follow 
the guidelines strictly, the measures they have in place are based on the professional 
guidelines.  As one would suspect, the major factors in not implementing all the 
guidelines were time and money, even from respondents who felt that university officials 
understood the importance of the collections held. 
Effects of Bland’s Crimes 
Not unexpectedly, it appears based on interviews that Gilbert Bland’s crimes had 
the greatest effect on target institutions.  However, though Bland’s actions caused alarm 
throughout the profession, and shone a spotlight on the insufficiency of security measures 
in major academic library special collections, it appears his story was not as effective a 
cautionary tale as one might suspect.  Interviews with respondents in target institutions 
show the discovery of Bland’s crimes led to an increased understanding of the need for 
improvements in security, even though those improvements could be costly.  All target 
respondents made security changes after Bland, but the extent of those changes varied 
from institution to institution.  Not all respondents required the checking of personal 
items before Bland, but after Bland they all do.  Four respondents had their reading 
rooms rearranged so as to ensure better and more thorough monitoring of patrons.  All of 
the target respondents have added electronic monitoring devices, and most, but not all, of 
the other respondents indicated they now have electronic surveillance as well.  This 
surveillance exists mainly in the form of cameras, but also includes motion sensors and 
alarmed doors. 
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Bland also affected the issue of publicizing thefts and cooperating with others to 
better ensure the return of stolen items.  All of the target respondents indicated that they 
were made aware of Bland’s thefts and mutilations at their repositories by outside parties, 
six from the postings on ExLibris and two by phone calls from the FBI.  Though some 
respondents indicated they are still somewhat uncomfortable with publicizing thefts, all 
respondents said that they would indeed publicize any thefts in the future and cooperate 
with others in order to boost their chances of having items found and returned.  
Even after the discovery of Bland’s crimes, six of the eight respondents from 
target institutions still do not have a formal, written security policy and five do not have a 
library security officer.  Additionally, though most respondents developed relationships 
with local authorities, as well as the FBI, during the Bland incidents, not all respondents 
have maintained a cooperative relationship with outside authorities. 
Interviewees from repositories that were not targeted by Bland indicate that Bland 
did not have as wide an effect on the profession as assumed.  Though all interviewees 
were familiar with the Bland case, only one confirmed that they made changes based 
solely on that case.  Additionally, thirteen of the fifteen non-target respondents were 
unaware of any incidents of theft or mutilation in their own repositories.  It is not known 
if Bland admitted to all of his crimes and targets, so it is quite possible that those who 
believe they have not been victims of theft are simply naïve.  Only three (13%) of the 
non-target respondents affirmed that they do have a formal, written policy, but as with the 
targeted institutions, most do not.  As they also had no incidents of crime, to their 
knowledge, six respondents have not developed a cooperative relationship with outside 
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local authorities, although thirteen asserted they had some sort of relationship with 
campus police.   
Much like the target respondents, non-target respondents stated they do not follow 
the recommended professional guidelines strictly.  Most, however, have implemented the 
same measures as target repositories.  Recommended measures that most of them follow 
are the registration of researchers, requiring researchers to stow personal items outside of 
the reading room, monitoring of the reading room, and permanent retention of researcher 
registrations.  Again like target respondents, most non-target respondents are not able to 
conduct regular shelf reading or inventories due to the volume of their collections, but 
three asserted they have ongoing shelf reading by student employees, and most have 
limited access to materials with closed stacks. 
Some of the non-target respondents have added electronic surveillance equipment 
such as alarms, and tattle-tape devices or security strips in materials.  Cameras in the 
reading rooms are rarer among this group, and a good number of repositories still rely 
solely on employee monitoring of the reading room during open hours. 
Only two non-target respondents indicated they were aware of any incidents of 
theft or mutilation in their repositories.  In those cases legal actions were taken by both, 
but neither indicated that new security measures were not put into place because of the 
incidents. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The value of rare books and manuscripts has been steadily increasing for decades.  
The digitization of materials and the placement of finding aids online have made it easier 
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for thieves to locate items they may wish to steal.   Nonetheless, many repositories do not 
follow the recommended professional guidelines, even though they have remained much 
the same since the 1970s and several well publicized thefts have occurred in the 
intervening years.  In most cases, the lack of implementing recommended security 
measures are a result of low budgets and limited time.  While curators and archivists are 
aware of guideline recommendations, they do not feel they are all necessary or feasible.  
As the case of Gilbert Bland has shown, it is often impossible to discover if a theft 
has occurred.  In the case of Bland, those running the repositories that were targeted were 
made aware of the thefts only when the Peabody publicized their incident and warned 
others that their materials were part of a hit list in Bland’s notebook.  It is still not known, 
and likely never will be, if there were more materials stolen by Bland than has been 
reported.  Even when the FBI contacted some repositories to inform them that they had 
materials stolen by Bland, they were rebuffed by a few who would not admit, even to 
themselves, that they were vulnerable to theft. 
The recommendation of publicizing thefts and working cooperatively with others 
for a better chance of having materials returned has been a part of the guidelines for 
decades.  Nonetheless, it was a recommendation that most professionals ignored out of 
fear of their repositories being seen as vulnerable and potentially scaring off donors.  The 
Bland case had a lot to do with this recommendation finally being implemented in many 
repositories.  The institutions victimized by Bland discovered first hand how important it 
is to the profession for information to be shared.  Even those that were not directly 
affected by Bland relate that they would most likely make public any thefts they might 
suffer, in order to have the stolen items returned to their care.  It seems that this, at least, 
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was a change that Bland’s crimes brought not just to his targets, but also to many others 
within the profession.  Anybody still ignoring the recommendations of cooperation is 
forgoing the opportunity to recover materials if conscientious dealers are alerted to the 
thefts and, similarly, authorities are alerted when certain materials are brought in for sale.   
Repositories with rare books and special collections need to seriously consider 
implementing the other security recommendations that are a part of the professional 
guidelines.  As the Bland case shows, many repositories were not aware of having 
incidents of theft.  This is likely still the case for repositories that have not implemented 
all the recommendations.  The guidelines are meant not only to help professionals deal 
with thefts after the fact, but to prevent them.  Prevention of theft and avoidance of the 
need to track items is of vital importance.  While electronic security measures can 
certainly be costly, the loss of materials can be even more costly.  Not only do many of 
the items in special collection repositories have high monetary value, they carry great 
historic value as well.  The public’s ability to access these historic documents cannot 
really be measured monetarily.  If cost-benefit analyses are done in purely financial 
terms, it is not just the repositories that will lose.  All of us will lose.  Bland and other 
criminals have taught valuable lessons about the importance of securing the historical 
record, but those lessons are for naught if we continue to ignore them. 
Security in special collections is still a sensitive area for many.  Most of the 
people who were requested to participate in this research study declined.  Though not all 
responded with a reason for not participating, the answers from three in particular 
indicate a discomfort in sharing security information, although knowledge of a 
repository’s security measures is often enough to deter criminals.  Even Gilbert Bland, 
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who was audacious enough to commit his crimes in broad daylight, while being 
monitored, could have been deterred, or perhaps stopped sooner.  As he told 
investigators, “If there would have been a [security] camera there I never would’ve went 
in, I never would’ve stayed there, I never would’ve ordered any books…”51
                                                 
51 Harvey, Island of Lost Maps, 343. 
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APPENDIX A – TARGET INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Security Procedures 
 
1) Do you have a formal* security program?  If yes, was there one before the Bland 
incidents?  *Formal: written, part of official policies & procedures, part of staff training 
& orientation 
 
2) Do you have a cooperative* relationship with local authorities?  Did you before? 
*Cooperative: contact names and numbers known to staff, written procedures for 
contacting local authorities as in disaster planning, have been in touch with local 
authorities and possibly discussed emergency response. 
 
3) Do you perform regular inventories (such as shelf reading)?  Did you before Bland? 
 
4) Were security standards based on the professional guidelines (RBMS) in place before 
the thefts? 
 
5) Were new security measures put into place after the Bland incidents?  If so, what were 
they? 
Was there a significant increase in budget for security issues? 
Was there an increase in background checks of staff? 
Was there an increase in focus on users? 
New registration procedures? Changes to monitoring? 
 
6) Do you have a security committee and/or security officer?  If yes, was there one before 
Bland? 
 
7) Is there signage indicating what the security measures are to patrons? 
 
8) What do you believe is the role of librarian/archivist in preventing crime? 
 
Bland Thefts 
 
9) How was your repository made aware of the theft(s)? 
 Was it detected internally or was there notice from authorities or another victim 
library? 
 
10) Were the identified stolen/destroyed items insured and thus value known? 
 
11) If it is known, how long was it between the incidents and their detection? 
 
12) How many items were involved? How many were recovered? 
 
13) Is/was there concern about publicizing incidents? 
If so, what were these concerns? 
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APPENDIX B – NON-TARGET INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Security Procedures 
 
1) Do you have a formal* security program?  If yes, how long has it been in place?  How 
frequently is it updated?  *Formal: written, official policies & procedures, part of staff 
training. 
 
2) Have you had any major incidents of theft or mutilation of materials? 
 When did they take place? 
 Were legal actions taken against the perpetrator? 
  If so, what was the outcome (jail, fine, etc.)? 
 
3) Do you have a cooperative* relationship with local authorities?  When was this 
instituted?  Was it in response to any particular incident? 
*Cooperative: contact names and numbers known to staff, written procedures for 
contacting local authorities as in disaster planning, have been in touch with local 
authorities and possibly discussed emergency response. 
 
4) Do you perform regular inventories (shelf reading)?  When did these begin? 
 
5) Are security standards based on the professional guidelines (RBMS) in place?  Have 
they always been in place or were they in response to an incident? 
 
6) Were new security measures put into place after any particular incidents?  If so, what? 
Was there a significant increase in budget for security issues? 
Was there an increase in background checks of staff? 
Was there an increase in focus on users? 
New registration procedures? Changes to monitoring? 
 
7) Do you have a security committee and/or security officer?  If yes, how long has it been 
in place? 
 
8) Is there signage indicating to patrons what the security measures are? 
 
9) What do you believe is the role of librarian/archivist in preventing crime? 
 
If there was an incident of theft/mutilation: 
 
10) How was your repository made aware of the theft(s)? 
Was it detected internally or was there notice from the authorities or another 
victim library? 
 
10) Were the identified stolen/destroyed items insured and thus value known? 
 
11) If it is known, how long was it between the incidents and their detection? 
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12) How many items were involved? How many were recovered? 
 
13) Is/was there concern about publicizing incidents? 
If so, what were these concerns? 
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